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Strategic Implications of Piracy in Benin's Territorial Waters
Maritime piracy is easy to define and generally refers to security flaws along the marine borders of a country, particularly through unlawful acts at sea. 1 Nonetheless, multiple organizations and authors offer differing definitions. According to Webster's Dictionary, piracy is an act of robbery on the high seas. 2 This unlawful act on the high seas is not only a threat to Benin, but it is also an obstacle to peace, security and stability for the countries in the Gulf of Guinea that seek to increase export revenue by developing their abundant natural resources.
Piracy is not a new phenomenon in the Gulf of Guinea. However, its frequency and negative impact on the safety, security, well-being and economies of the region has grown steadily in the first decade of the twenty-first century. The variety of each country's national interests, the peculiarities associated with the maritime environment, and the gravity of piracy requires that all stakeholders, political leaders, international organizations and the private sector work together to efficiently mitigate or reduce this
challenge.
An analysis of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea shows that an increasing number of acts of piracy took place between 2000 and 2012. 3 The economic fragility of the countries in the Gulf of Guinea, and Benin specifically, suggests that piracy is a major threat to social climate, national security and national economies. The purpose of this document is to diagnose the current state of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, demonstrate piracy's strategic implications on the national development of Benin and offer a comprehensive strategic approach to reduce piracy from Benin's national waters and from the Gulf of Guinea. At the regional level, these goals may be met by the existing Gulf of Guinea Commission with the help of the United States' building partner capacity 2 program. 4 For its national and strategic interests, Benin must focus its struggle against piracy by developing a comprehensive strategic approach through leadership promotion, security and maritime law enforcement and by building national and regional capacity through effective partnerships.
The Strategic Context and Piracy
The geographical area of the Gulf of Guinea extends from the northeastern part of the tropical Atlantic, with Angola to the south, and Cape Palmas in Liberia to the west. 5 The Gulf of Guinea is formed by the convergence of the West, Central and South
West coasts of Africa and covers about 250,000 square nautical miles. 6 From West
Central to South West Africa, four linguistic groups, from the former colonial, British, Spanish, French and Portuguese overlay domestic languages like Hausa, Wolof, Yoruba, cover a wide range of geological, geographical and cultural diversity in the region. Among the many rivers that drain into the Gulf are the Niger and the Volta. The coastline of the Gulf includes the Bight of Benin and the Bight of Bonny. The Niger River, in particular, has deposited organic sediments out to sea which, over millions of years, have become crude oil.
Oil production in the Gulf of Guinea is the primary reason that piracy is of wider international importance. According to the International Crisis Group's article, "Rising Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea", the region supplies around 40 percent of Europe's and 29 percent of the US's oil. 7 New growing world economies, such as China and India,are also getting involved in the region for oil. This combination of factors makes the Gulf of Guinea one of the world's major geostrategic oil and gas exploration hot spots. 8 Keeping these shipping lanes open, and safe, is vital for the world's oil supply and critical to the global economy.
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The region is also rich in other aquatic marine resources, such as fish and shrimp, making it a major global fishery. It also possesses large mineral reserves such as aluminum, bauxite, coal, cobalt, copper, diamond, gold, iron ore, steel and uranium making it a future source that could meet global needs for raw materials. 9 Overall, the Gulf of Guinea is a major source of revenue for the surrounding nations, of energy for the developed world, and a major lane for maritime shipping activities. This makes the Gulf of Guinea of strategic interest to the United States.
Despite this wealth of natural resources, the countries of the Gulf of Guinea continue to struggle to increase their revenues as they combat the threat of piracy. The abundant oil and natural resources could potentially be used as a source of financing to combat common threats, including piracy. Unfortunately, the weaknesses of these countries concerning security and defense systems at the national level, as well as their lack of operational coordination, not only provide an enabling environment for piracy, but encourage non-state actors to use the Gulf for drug and human smuggling, poaching, illegal fishing and small arms trafficking. In 2011, the United Nations Security
Council reported four emerging threats in the area: drug trafficking, terrorism, piracy and unconstitutional change to government. The Council cited these threats as the most important obstacles to political stability and economic prosperity in the Gulf of Guinea.
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With regard to its potential, it is important to identify multiple competing territorial claims which, before piracy became prevalent, posed the greatest threat and challenge to the region. 11 The contested nature of the waters in the Gulf of Guinea further complicates the situation. Given the inherent distrust among the various actors due to these competing territorial claims, there may lay little incentive to cooperate if they 4 remain focused on their own relatively narrow interests. This condition makes it easy for any actor wishing to control the resources of an area to use piracy as a tool to disrupt his competitors. In other words, states or non-state actors can use piracy as a means to achieve a political objective. Future wars in the Gulf of Guinea could result from piracy activities, presenting new threats to national and regional peace and security. This research focuses on the strategic implications of piracy as a common challenge to all governments in the area and suggests solutions within the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC), as a sub regional organization, and the US, as an international partner. The GGC is composed of the eight countries of Angola, Cameroon, Gabon, Equatorial-Guinea, Nigeria, Republic of Congo, Democratic
Republic of Congo and Sao Tome and Principe. 13 Even though Benin is part of the geographical area, it is not a member of the GGC. While the governments within the GGC attempt to meet their common challenges through lateral and bilateral cooperation, tensions arise over issues of nationalism, sovereignty and regional 15 and between the Republic of Gabon and the Republic of EquatorialGuinea. 16 As stated before, piracy is a major threat to oil and natural resource exploitation, scientific research, and environmental protection in the Gulf of Guinea. The natural resources and geostrategic potential of the Gulf of Guinea cannot be fully exploited due to the existing weaknesses in the maritime environment. The overall potential of the Gulf of Guinea is undermined by domestic, regional and international threats and challenges. These vulnerabilities exacerbate political instability and poor socioeconomic conditions. The inadequate military capabilities of the region's states exacerbate the situation, making it difficult to achieve a calculated relationship between ends, ways and means that would efficiently combat piracy. In such a volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous environment, Benin has developed a national initiative and expertise that can be used to draft a regional response to combat piracy off the coast of the Gulf of Guinea.
Benin and Piracy
The Republic of Benin, a maritime country, has a 125 km coastline on the Gulf of According to the Navy Chief in Cotonou, there was a 70% decrease in maritime traffic to the port in the third quarter of 2011 because of the higher insurance costs triggered by piracy. 23 The costs of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea region from stolen cargos, higher insurance premiums and security costs are estimated to reach $2 billion each year, compared with $7 billion from Somali piracy. 24 Consequently, the economy, the security and the social environment of Benin are at risk. Thus, the kind of international naval deployment used against Somali pirates is unlikely to help because this is not "high water" piracy.
This complexity makes piracy difficult to solve, which exacerbates its strategic implications for a new democratic government, such as Benin, which is seeking to enhance the liberty, human rights, economic prosperity and security of its people.
Solving piracy requires a balance of power between the people, the government and the military to develop a lawful use of the instruments of state power through legal codes and equipment capacity to face this challenge. As previously stated, President Yayi considers dealing with piracy of vital importance for the state. Benin is unique in the region because the State does not gain revenue from oil exploitation and is threatened by pirate activities which are scaring shipping away from the port of Cotonou on which the country's revenues depend. Benin's current President's desire is to promote good governance and develop formal and legal economic activities for its population. The strategic implications of secondary effects of piracy on Benin's democratic development affect three domains: economic, social and domestic security, and political.
Economic Implications
It is clear that because of the frequency of piracy activity in Benin's maritime coast, there is reduced revenue from seaport activities for Benin's national treasury.
This affects Benin's government in two ways. First, there is the loss of income from port fees as ships are re-routed to other destinations. Second, Benin is prevented from raising revenues due to its incapability to exploit natural resources including fishing activities in the Gulf of Guinea. The local population involved in traditional fishing activities has complained about security due to the risks of piracy attacks.
Benin's former Defense Minister, Dr. Issifou Kogui N'DOURO said that "his country depended largely on fees raised from that port. Indeed, it generated 70 percent of the country's gross national product and 80 percent of the income for the national budget; it also accounted for 90 percent of the trade. Benin to a list of areas perceived as a high risk due to increased pirate attacks in the Gulf of Guinea. 36 According to the International Maritime Bureau, there were 32 piracy incidents recorded off the coast of Benin in the first half of 2012, up from 25 attacks reported in 2011. 37 Regardless of the precise number of pirate incidents, piracy is inflicting significant damage on the economic system of Benin and of the region.
Overall, the costs of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea both from stolen cargos and higher insurance premiums and security costs are estimated to reach $2 billion each year. 38 The nations of the Gulf of Guinea depend on international trade for their supply of various finished products manufactured in other parts of the world and for the commercialization of their raw materials. Thus, shipping is a strategic gateway to integrate international markets and develop national economies. Piracy effectively closes this gateway through increased maritime insurance costs and declining customs and port revenues because ship owners tend to avoid the region.
Another economic impact of piracy is the inflow of 'offline' money for corrupt purposes. The money earned from piracy creates a second illegal economy that the state cannot tax or access through regulation. In the Gulf of Guinea, states are economically interdependent. Individual national prosperity cannot be achieved independently from other states. Within this context, economic problems in one state inevitably affect other states. Coordinated action is necessary due to piracy's links to other forms of organized crime such as drug trafficking, poaching, sea robbery, illegal bunkering and crude oil theft, pipeline vandalism and sabotage. That is why it is important to point out the strategic deals between some insurance companies, ship owners, pirates and illegal finance groups who benefit from the security system's vulnerability. These deals undercut the legitimate economic viability of the state.
However, the economic costs of piracy also have an impact elsewhere. The multiple consequences of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea affect the main activities of 13 seaport businesses, diminish state revenue and increase the opportunities for organized and transnational criminals with economic power to take effective control of the state via corruption. That is the example of Guinea-Bissau. 39 This means piracy has a social impact on the state and the domestic security of its people.
Social Impact and Domestic Security Implications
The economic impact of piracy has serious ramifications for the social and 45 This situation directly affects the ability of the state to shape the national security environment for the population and maintain the overall political and economic legitimacy of the official governmental institutions. In fact, non-state actors can take control of the organs of the state by financing piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. They gain this control because of the profit they make out of piracy and the black market oil industry. 46 Non-state actors use this revenue to buy and corrupt officials in order to increase their business. The case of Guinea
Bissau is an example of such corruption in which the weakness of the state security and defense systems permits organized criminal groups to control the economic system and influence political power. 47 The urgency of the struggle against piracy creates a volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous environment for Benin's policy makers. All the above factors directly impact the state's ability to govern itself by enhancing the selfempowerment of criminals and other non-state actors.
Political Consequences
As mentioned before, the decrease of Benin's revenue in seaport activities endangers the national treasury and impacts the social and security effects of criminality. It endangers Benin's economic base, Benin's effective sovereignty and the continuation of Benin's peaceful democratic system. The government cannot find the financial resources to face this challenge. Non-state actors became important, and wealthy, by creating mutually beneficial connections between themselves and some insurers, shippers and business men, all of whom profit from piracy. 48 In the future, these actors could come to control the political system and run for election because of the money earned from illegal and criminal networks.
The political issue in Nigeria with MEND rebel activities is an example of the second and third-order effects. Amnesty largely served to benefit the MEND leadership, leaving those in the lower ranks desperate for economic opportunities and open to recruitment for piracy operations. The armed branch of the MEND, an independent criminal gang implicated for piracy, is composed mainly of former Nigerian rebels who joined the criminal ranks following this amnesty in Nigeria. 49 The political environment in Nigeria is a significant contributing factor to the rise in piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.
Meanwhile, pirate attacks in the Gulf of Guinea frequently target tankers, as well as oilfield service and support vessels. Piracy in this area has escalated over the years from low-level armed robberies to hijacking, cargo thefts and large scale robberies. regional armies in the Gulf of Guinea. 59 However, Benin's armed forces lack the operational capacity and financial resources to engage in a persistent planned campaign for maritime security. In other words, Benin's navy, air force and gendarmerie, due to weaknesses in equipment and professional training, are not efficiently coordinated and centralized for best result on the sea as well as on the ground.
In Benin, like elsewhere in the Gulf, the oil industry is one of the main lures for piracy. These two major economic activities are consistently linked to Benin's coast and together make up a well-financed criminal phenomenon, a parallel industry with a well developed supply chain and growing sophistication. The complexity and ambiguity of this environment is detrimental to the success of investigations in the domains of piracy and transnational criminality. That is why it will be useful to implement the organizational leadership skills needed to impact the mentality of security forces. This may change the perceptions of the people and convince them to join in a comprehensive approach to fight piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.
This initiative means a better professionalization for security forces in charge of investigations and the control and surveillance of counter-piracy activities, not only in Benin's EEZ, but also amongst the local population and regional community.
Due to the lack of financial resources, it is difficult for the government to defend its democracy, its values and its interests and solve this challenge alone. The government of Benin cannot effectively exploit its oil resources in the Gulf of Guinea and find money to protect its coastline. The country needs financial resources and international help to fight piracy off the Gulf of Guinea. For these reasons, Benin's government developed a National Maritime Safety, Security and Protection Strategy.
This strategy is very good as it is a way to preserve and maintain state action on the sea. But Benin's government needs the financial resources, combined with intelligence and security assistance cooperation, to efficiently implement this strategy. The US is a key partner that must play a substantial role in the security and law enforcement assistance to Benin to combat piracy in support of mutual interests in the region.
Role of the US
The stability of Benin's democracy and economic prosperity provide valuable opportunities to improve the relationship between the US Department of Defense and Politically, Benin's democratic system offers an opportunity to leverage the current President's leadership as a base to help Benin's government and members of the GGC to develop a regional strategic response to better balance the relationship between the ends, ways and means available to fight piracy. As part of this, it is the responsibility of Benin's authorities to increase, at the national level, the national capacity to efficiently face piracy. This will permit the development at the regional level of a comprehensive strategic approach to promote organizational leadership, maritime law enforcement and criminal investigation policy. Then Benin can build a new partnership with the US Department of Defense to tackle piracy off Benin's coast and within the Gulf of Guinea. This comprehensive approach needs to focus on modernizing counter-piracy laws, strengthening capacities for maritime law enforcement and criminal investigation, supporting national and regional intelligence networks and increasing knowledge sharing with civil society organizations.
Promotion of a Regional Leadership
Strong political will and national ownership are vital parts of an effective strategy.
Leaders and citizens must demonstrate commitment to address corruption and implement comprehensive strategies. Given the transnational character of piracy threats, this political will must also be expressed regionally through the GGC. In this vein, countries in the GGC must be willing to cede sovereignty concerns to advance regional solutions in this regard.
Due to its strategic interest, Benin's government must take the lead in dealing with the problem of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea for two main reasons: First, its national economy is dangerously affected and Benin needs financial resources to implement its national strategy to fight piracy and develop the country. Benin does not base it national budget on oil exploitation revenue to share with its population, but other countries in the GGC do. 63 Second, Benin needs to take the lead to generate a common vision regarding security challenges in this region rich in oil resources and minerals.
Benin's head of state has gained a rich experience in consensus building as the former President of the African Union Commission. He can take advantage of his leadership to balance both Benin's national interest and the interests of the other member states of the GGC. In the Gulf of Guinea, states must have a common security objective, or End, in the comprehensive strategy against piracy. Unfortunately, uncoordinated initiatives, conflicts of interest, duplication of effort and undue rivalry amongst the various stakeholders over time have prevented regional cooperation.
A common framework will be more effective in dealing with piracy. In order to build a common vision, it will be important to build consensus, generate political will, and incorporate civil society for a better civilian and military relationship between the 23 states. The concept of common heritage needs to be established for nations that are pooling resources for the benefit of their people. This common vision will help lead to changes in the mentality and perceptions of common interests leading to strategic dialogues between stakeholders in the GGC. This initiative will also heighten public awareness among the stakeholders to encourage a better regional political commitment to mobilize national and regional financial resources to combat piracy. It is important that each state is convinced of the necessity for shared advantages to predominate instead of insisting on self-serving notions of statehood and sovereignty. Therefore, it is useful to expand the membership of the GGC to include all of the coastal countries from Angola to Liberia. This will increase the success of the fund raising, financing regional materials and equipment acquisition processes.
This is a new domain of cooperation for Benin's diplomacy. As of today, Benin is not yet a member of the GGC. Benin's diplomacy must take the opportunity presented by the phenomenon of piracy in the Gulf to become part of this sub-regional organization and promote a regional strategy against piracy. Benin's political stability, example of democracy and good governance are key factors favoring this political objective. These conditions will help Benin be the neutral party who can overcome mistrust within the GGC. In addition to joining the GGC, Benin can take a lead role in reviewing the definition of piracy according to the context of the region.
Security and Maritime Law Enforcement
Martin N. Murphy, in his book Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money, suggests seven factors that create the foundation for successful and active piracy. 64 The legal and jurisdictional factors are of most concern to the GGC. 65 With regard to international law, piracy is addressed in the 1982 United Nations Convention on Law of the Seas (UNCLOS III). The convention provides the legal basis for nations to take action against pirates in international waters and areas outside the legal jurisdiction of any other state.
In this way, UNCLOS allows every state to apprehend, arrest, and prosecute pirates and seize their property. 66 The need for a common legal framework against piracy in the Gulf of Guinea also finds its main strength within the jurisdictional issues as stated before. Even if the definition of piracy was clear among the countries of the Gulf of Guinea, the lack of a common jurisdiction remains a challenge. If, for Benin's government, all attacks in national waters are considered piracy, the international legal jurisdiction to deal with pirates contradicts Benin's interpretation of piracy. Benin sees piracy as a universal crime and states must intervene according to international conventions. 67 Consequently the "definition" or "jurisdiction" for pirate activities must be clarified by the main actors.
Benin's government is aware of this ambiguity and has held two regional workshops on maritime security in Cotonou in order to find a regional approach to this issue. The first one, held in November 2006, concluded with the adoption of an action plan that was agreed to by each of the 11 participating Gulf of Guinea nations. 68 The second one was a workshop in November 2011 that helped Benin authorities to develop a maritime strategy and promoted a framework harmonization with civil society and military leaders at the local level. OCEA-Built 32m coastal patrol craft. 71 However, according to the Navy Chief, Benin needs more than $10 billion to implement the maritime strategy to face and monitor this challenge along its coastline.
To attain this objective Benin should negotiate and implement a Memorandum of Group to study a way to implement Benin's maritime strategy for the benefit of both the US and Benin's strategic interests. This can be expanded at the regional level to include the Defense Ministers of the states of the Gulf of Guinea.
In Benin, the Gendarmerie, which is part of the Army, needs to create a specialized detachment for security and maritime law enforcement called "Maritime For example, the US Coast Guard can help the naval forces of the countries in the Gulf of Guinea to organize themselves along similar lines. Thus, the US will be able to maintain a dissuasive and preventive presence in parts of the area in collaboration with navies of all the countries of the GGC.
The financial contribution of the GGC will permit sustained naval operations, aerial reconnaissance and bolster the security presence and effectiveness of regional Coast Guards. The main financial resources to apply this regional strategy can come from contributions funded by the oil exploitation of each state in the GGC. Each state of the GGC must share its revenue from the exploitation of oil production and natural resources to finance a national and regional strategy against piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. This would be based on a comprehensive understanding of the potential challenges to everyone's national economies. Thus, the financial assets could be allocated to the fight against the common challenges of piracy, for example, through the Gulf of Guinea Energy Security Strategy. 75 This comprehensive approach supports the idea of "African solutions for African problems." Therefore, a national and regional legal protocol is needed to authorize Benin's naval forces to enforce laws and have a strategy in such cases as when the mission of counter-piracy or other law enforcement tasks is specifically given to the navy. For example, the African Maritime Law Enforcement Program (AMLEP) initiated by the US Department of Homeland Security helps to detect and deter illicit activities in the Gulf of Guinea. 76 However, piracy is a new threat that needs a specific strategy among security forces. Elements of such a strategy must include human resource development, maritime law enforcement, security, and cross border coordination, regional financing 
Conclusion
The Gulf of Guinea, as a maritime economic zone with huge resources, is strategically important to Benin, the US, and to the world's economy. The potential of the Gulf of Guinea is being undermined by multifaceted domestic, regional and international threats and vulnerabilities. Piracy poses significant risks to stability in the region and especially in Benin. Through the current economic context, piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is a challenge to Benin's democracy and national interests, to the protection and the security of its people and to the preservation of its statehood. It has led to huge annual revenue loss, constrained investment and economic prospects and impeded maritime shipping activities for improved trade and commerce.
Effective national and regional security cooperation and better economic governance are required to prevent the region from becoming another Gulf of Aden for illegal, transnational and criminal networks. 80 Piracy is a major regional problem. It is compromising the development of this strategic economic area and threatening maritime trade in the short term and the stability of coastal states in the long term. 
